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Decisions about the provision and 
delivery of public goods and services 
take place within the framework 
established by America's most dis-
tinctive political invention-federal-
ism. Author after author reminds 
students and scholars alike that 
policy making can be understood 
only from an intergovernmental per-
spective. But to use a term such as 
''intergovernmental policy making'' 
thrusts one into two distinctive 
analytic worlds which, at best, are 
loosely woven together. 
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Many conventional models of 
policy making give little place to fed-
eral arrangements or to the factors 
that sustain American federalism. 
Equally problematic, efforts to 
model federalism often do not take 
advantage of the conceptually more 
developed policy making literature. 
An unfortunate consequence of this 
"separateness" is the regular appear-
ance of policy studies with hypothe-
ses or conclusions that could have 
been easily explained or predicted 
had the author been more familiar 
or Representatives (June 13): 53-55. 
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with the corpus of work available 
on American federalism. 
Compounding this lack of con-
ceptual integration between federal-
ism and policy-making studies is the 
continuing tendency to downplay or 
even ignore the activities and influ-
ence of state governments. To use 
states as an observational unit of 
analysis is not the same as granting 
state governments the explanatory 
status of a "structural variable" 
(Scheuch 1969; Ragin 1987). 
Although information about states 
PS: Political Science & Politics 
comprises the data bases for numer-
ous intergovernmental and policy 
analyses, nevertheless, states are not 
accorded an explanatory role com-
mensurate with their: impact on 
public policy. 
The two essays on public policy 
analysis by Susan Hansen and on 
federalism by David Beam et al. in 
Political Science: The State of the 
Discipline (Finifter 1983) confirm the 
striking separation of federalism/ 
intergovernmental relations from 
policy analysis. For example, Hansen 
(239) in her conclusion notes that the 
distinctive contribution political sci-
entists can play in policy analysis, in 
contrast to that of economists, is 
" ... to pose questions about admin-
istrative effectiveness or organiza-
tional structures .... " But Hansen's 
review of the development of policy 
studies demonstrates that models of 
the policy process up to 1983 did lit-
tle to incorporate federal features or 
state governments as explanatory 
variables. Beam and his co-authors 
(271) acknowledge the atheoretical 
character of federalism studies. To 
improve theorizing about federalism, 
they recommend a strategy which 
includes " ... a fuller recognition 
that the national government now 
depends very heavily upon state and 
local governments. . . . '' They go on 
to note "the need to link . . . " 
policy studies to federalism research. 
"Forgotten Federalism" 
Hamilton and Wells (1990, 1) 
unabashedly declare that "federalism 
is simply too often forgotten." A 
quick perusal of common public 
policy textbooks confirms their 
assessment. While not "forgetting" 
federalism completely, policy text-
books pay brief homage to America's 
federal government. Federalism is 
depicted as a contextual feature 
which conditions the behavior of 
individuals and groups, typically 
expressed as "federalism disperses 
power" or ". . . permits policy 
diversity." This ritualistic recognition 
of federalism includes some com-
bination of the following topics: 
reasons for federalism, historical 
eras, the grant system, and the com-
plications for policy makers. Seldom 
are students presented with a con-
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ceptual framework or a model that 
links the components of federal orga-
nization to the formulation, adop-
tion, or implementation of policy. By 
forgetting the considerable body of 
writing on American federalism, 
policy analysts continue to produce 
research findings that could have 
been easily explained or derived from 
the intergovernmental literature. 
For too long as well, federalism 
scholars have contributed to the 
neglect of intergovernmental aspects 
in policy modeling. Inability to make 
progress on ending the theoretical 
weakness of federal studies has not 
prompted others to turn to the sub-
field for useful concepts. Second, the 
short supply of detailed information, 
other than fiscal information, about 
many aspects of state and local gov-
ernment make it difficult to discover 
cross-state or cross-level patterns. In 
some cases, it is easier to engage in 
cross-national research than it is to 
do comparative state or intergovern-
mental research. Third, the methodo-
logical and cost challenges of con-
ducting research across several states, 
as exemplified by the field network 
strategy, require substantial 
resources. 
Models of Policy Formulation 
Of course, the manner and the 
degree to which federalism/inter-
governmental relations intertwine 
with policy making depends on the 
phase of the policy process one has 
under consideration. Widely accepted 
models of policy formulation such as 
iron triangles, issue networks, and 
agenda-building offer scant reference 
to federal arrangements or to the 
diversity of subnational cultures and 
place-based interests that dynamically 
support and are sustained by Ameri-
can federalism. PIGs, or intergovern-
mental lobbies, are categorized as 
just one more interest group in the 
"policy soup." Certainly, states and 
localities behave as pressure groups; 
but their constitutional status em-
powers them with legitimate author-
ity not exercised by other types of 
groups as well as institutional access 
not available to other interests. 
With so many competing policy 
models, it is only natural that some 
American f'ederalism 
conceptual devices do a better 
explanatory job than others. Iron tri-
angles, for example, offer little 
heuristic value in explaining specific 
instances of state officials derailing 
presidential initiatives, such as the 
National Governors Association's 
bipartisan resistance that doomed 
Reagan's "turnback and swap" pro-
posal to devolve programs to the 
states. On the other hand, diffusion 
of innovation models offers clear 
insights into the growing influence of 
state policy initiatives that arrive on 
the national agenda and are ultimate-
ly adopted (e.g., education reform, 
environmental protection, health 
care, and "workfare"). 
Even agenda-setting models, prob-
ably the most sophisticated frame-
work for exploring policy formula-
tion, downplay the impact of the 
federal matrix. State government 
officials, because of their place in 
American federalism, have a number 
of doors, not just windows, into the 
larger national policy process. Wright 
(1988, 275) identified nine issue areas 
in which governors can work to 
shape national policy. Governors also 
possess a freedom of action that 
encompasses personal contact with 
presidents, strategy sessions with 
their state congressional delegation, 
negotiations with federal administra-
tors, and mobilization of public 
opinion in their home state and 
throughout the nation. 
Other state government officials 
also possess the capacity and 
resources by which to influence 
national policy (see Krane 1993). A 
covert example of state power over 
national policy can be found in the 
1991 reports from state capitals that 
state legislators were using the decen-
nial process of redrawing congres-
sional districts as a bargaining chip 
to extract policy promises from con-
gressional incumbents. The point 
here is simple: policy models that 
assign federalism to a contextual role 
which only creates complications or 
obstacles to action miss the funda-
mental fact that subnational officials 
are actors whose preferences embody 
the interests of a particular jurisdic-
tion. Put more simply, American fed-
eralism is more than a maze of insti-






Although implementation research 
from its earliest beginnings acknowl-
edged the intergovernmental dimen-
sions of the policy process, the role 
of state governments in policy imple-
mentation models has been cast in a 
curiously emasculated fashion. For 
example, top-down models view im-
plementation as a rational-technical 
process of assembling the necessary 
elements needed to penetrate through 
"bureaucratic-political" layers to the 
policy's target beneficiaries. Success-
ful top-down implementation 
depends on marshalling enough 
resources (money, trained personnel, 
facilities) to overcome the complexity 
of joint action, provided the national 
policy goals are sufficiently clear. 
The conceptual keys to implementa-
tion are three: the tractability of the 
problem, the capacity built into the 
statute, and the prevailing contextual 
conditions. Little acknowledgement is 
given, for example, to "picket-fence 
federalism" which as a description of 
implementation pre-dates the top-
down models, and even less recogni-
tion is given to the obvious point 
that the multi-layered, multi-actor 
"picket-fence" creates the necessity 
to infuse policies with enough capac-
ity to overcome the complexity of 
joint action (e.g., sufficient funds 
with which to purchase compliance 
from reluctant states). 
Bottom-up models stress the 
potential for deflection or distortion 
of national policy by local authori-
ties. The encounter of street-level 
bureaucrats with program clients is 
reputed to be the defining moment 
that actualizes the policy mandate. 
Local action that is faithful to 
national objectives serves as the 
benchmark for successful bottom-up 
implementation. While bottom-up 
models recognize the autonomy 
granted to subnational authorities by 
federalism, these behavioral-realist 
models sometimes so narrow their 
conceptual focus as to obscure the 
impact of state government on local 
actions. For example, the administra-
tion of welfare programs over the 
past twenty years has changed in 
important ways as a result of state 
government takeover of the old 
county welfare office. This change in 
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turn affects the ability to integrate 
welfare reform with education, train-
ing, and employment programs, 
many of which remain locally based. 
What is conceptually striking 
about many implementation models 
(of either direction) is the lack of 
attention to two of the earliest and 
best articulated frameworks, both of 
which begin with the attributes of the 
federal system. Pressman (1975) 
developed a "donor-recipient" 
model of the grant-in-aid process 
that explicitly incorporated the inter-
jurisdictional conflict, mutual depen-
dence, and power asymmetry of 
American federalism. Williams (1980) 
set forth a "shared governance" 
model of the "uneasy partnership" 
within federal programs. Only with 
American federalism is 
more than a maze of 
institutions; it is a matrix 
of reciprocal power 
relations. 
the "third generation" of implemen-
tation studies has the capacity of 
states and localities to act as "power 
wielders" (Pressman's term) been 
restored to the status of an explana-
tory variable. 
A Resurgence of 
State Governments as an 
Explanatory Variable 
Lack of attention to American fed-
eralism in explanations of public 
policy may be coming to an end. The 
post-1960 revitalization of state gov-
ernments, the growing demands to 
devolve public policy, and the 
national government's own fiscal dis-
tress have thrust state governments 
and American federalism back onto 
the agenda of both policy makers 
and model makers. Susan MacManus 
(1991, 203-54), in her "Looking to 
the Future" essay, cites figures that 
indicate many members of the APSA 
Organized Section on Federalism and 
Intergovernmental Relations also 
belong to another section, in par-
ticular public policy, public admin-
istration, urban politics, and law I 
courts/judicial politics. MacManus 
(212) goes on to review "new 
theories and findings" about federal-
ism and concludes that "the study of 
federalism and intergovernmental 
relations is now part of the political 
science 'mainstream' " and "today 
many researchers in our subfield are 
among the profession's leading schol-
ars and association leaders." 
MacManus is correct in her assess-
ment of federalism's return from the 
conceptual wilderness. However, for 
the renaissance in federalism studies 
to continue, the loose weaving of 
federalism with policy models must 
be tightened. One can see the need 
for transcending the treatment of 
intergovernmental relations as a con-
textual variable in policy studies by 
reviewing the changing fortunes of 
American federalism in the premier 
policy textbook. 
If one revisits the first edition 
(1972) of Thomas Dye's Understand-
ing Public Policy, the widely used 
and influential undergraduate text-
book, one finds no mention of fed-
eralism or intergovernmental rela-
tions. There is, however, a chapter 
devoted to "a systems analysis of 
state policies.'' A separate chapter on 
American federalism did not appear 
until the fifth edition (1984) and its 
historical (e.g., changes in federalism 
from dual to cooperative) and de-
scriptive (e.g., block versus categor-
ical grants) treatment of federalism 
carried over to the sixth edition 
(1987). In the current seventh edition 
(1992, 307-10) Dye has added, for 
the first time, a section which 
analyzes through the lens of public 
choice theory the impact of intergov-
ernmental competition on various 
types of policy (also see Dye 1990). 
No doubt this theoretical break-
through is a harbinger of models to 
come, but improved theorizing about 
federalism also needs to be infused 
into models of the policy process. 
Other signs that the paths of fed-
eralism and policy studies may be 
converging can be found in recent 
scholarship. Jack Treadway (1985) 
summarizes twenty years of the poli-
tics versus environment debate over 
policy outputs and uses his critical 
review to produce a model of the 
state policy-making process that com-
bines national and state level features 
PS: Political Science & Politics 
(including state political culture). 
Thomas Anton (1989, v) proposes a 
"benefits coalition" framework to 
explain how " ... the interrelation-
ships among levels [of government] 
that are the defining characteristics 
of American public policies." 
Robertson and Judd's (1989) policy 
text adopts a "new institutionalism" 
approach which emphasizes the inde-
pendent role of government in the 
policy making process. Paul Sabatier 
(1991), in laying out some directions 
for "better theories of the policy 
process," describes three models, 
each of which holds that government 
institutions are a critical explanatory 
variable for understanding public 
policy. 
Weaving Together 
Loose Theoretical Threads 
Research on American federalism, 
state governments, and public policy 
has produced two extensive fabrics of 
information that demonstrate it is 
possible to accumulate knowledge 
without substantial synthesis. In 
order to move toward more coher-
ence and integration of federal 
studies with policy analysis, a 
number of epistemological problems 
will have to be addressed. The list 
offered here is not a complete item-
ization of the many sharp philosoph-
ical points that can snag the warp 
and woof of theory; instead the 
points raised here are illustrative of 
the challenges of weaving together 
the threads of different subfields. 
One snag is the "combined-
effects" problem that is also encoun-
tered in the study of international 
relations. Interaction between two (or 
more) governments or organizations 
requires (1) identification of the 
internal and external factors that 
account for phenomenon under study 
and (2) determination of the relative 
causal strength of each factor. These 
"combined-effects" produce another 
tangle: that of multiple units of 
analysis. Both policy and federal 
studies struggle with the linkage of 
individuals and institutions, especially 
when the boundaries of organiza-
tional or jurisdictional units are 
"blurred." Third, the dynamics of 
the policy process coupled with the 
flux in federal institutions tear at 
any static theory. To cope with 
June 1993 
change, an integrative model would 
have to focus on activities which 
shape institutions and policies over 
time, such as decision making. A 
fourth epistemological point that can 
rip the fabric of theory is over-
reliance on a single type of informa-
tion (e.g., fiscal data). Working with 
a small number of data threads not 
only diminishes the richness of the 
theoretical pattern, but also reduces 
its generalizability; that is to say, the 
theoretical cloth produced will have 
too many holes. 1 
What kind of loom will weave 
together the threads of federalism 
and public policy? Over the last ten 
years there has been a lessening of 
the optimism that a theory of politics 
can be constructed by ignoring polit-
ical institutions (March and Olsen 
1984). The "new institutionalism" 
and the nascent theory of "policy 
design" share a theoretical concern 
with understanding the effects of dif-
ferent institutional structures on the 
behavior of individuals. The search 
for a "structural logic of policy" 
which " ... will contribute to a more 
refined understanding of the role of 
institutional factors in policy design'' 
(Linder and Peters 1990, 103) closely 
matches the message of the "new 
institutionalism''-' 'the organization 
of political life makes a difference." 
Efforts to increase the complement-
arity of rational choice models with 
institutional analysis appear to hold 
great potential for avoiding many of 
the snags to an integrative theory 
(Ostrom 1991). 
Only by weaving together the sep-
arate strands of federal studies with 
policy analysis can instructors help 
their students understand why 
Martha Derthick (1992, 675), in 
delivering the 1992 Gaus Lecture, 
revealed that she was seriously think-
ing of petitioning a federal judge for 
the right to vote in California. The 
reason she offered for this secret 
desire was her realization that in 
many policy areas she was governed 
by the state of California, even 
though she lived in Virginia! 
Note 
I. The points raised in this paragraph 
derive from the discussions of shortcomings 
in political inquiry found in Gillespie and 
Zinnes (1982), especially the essays by Judith 
Gillespie, Brian Job, and J. Donald Moon. 
American Federalism 
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Federalism has become a major 
issue in world affairs and conse-
quently in political science after 
many years of being ignored as a 
proper subject for political study 
except as intergovernmental relations 
in specifically federal systems, 
especially in the United States. Fed-
eralism should be understood both in 
its narrower sense as intergovernmen-
tal relations and in its larger sense as 
the combination of self-rule and 
shared rule through constitutional-
ized power sharing in a noncentral-
ized basis. 
Initially, comparative studies of 
federalism could be classified in three 
general groupings: 
(I) federalism in the English-
speaking world, particularly the 
British Empire, including imper-
ial federalism (Davis 1978; King 
1982; Wheare 1964); 
(2) federalism in the German-
speaking world, particularly Ger-
many and Switzerland (Frenkel 
1984; Ester bauer, Heraud and 
Pernthaler 1977); and 
(3) federalistic ideologies and 
schemes, mostly presented by 
philosophic advocates of federal-
ism as a utopian system (Marc 
1948; Marc and Aron 1948; 
Stevens 1977). 
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Federalism on the Agenda 
It is increasingly clear that federal-
ism itself, to use a biological analogy, 
is a genus that includes several 
species (Elazar 1987). One, federa-
tion, what most people today refer to 
as federalism, is the form of govern-
ment invented by the founding 
fathers of the United States in the 
Constitution of 1787 (Diamond 1959; 
Ostrom 1986). It establishes a com-
mon general government in which to 
form a polity, constituent units 
both govern themselves and share 
a common constitutional govern-
ment of the whole. Powers are 
delegated to the former by the people 
of all the units. Its dissolution can 
only come about through the consent 
of all or a majority of its constituent 
units. The general government has 
direct access to every citizen and 
supremacy in those areas in which it 
is granted authority (Wheare 1953; 
King 1982; Duchacek 1970). Arche-
typical modern federations include 
the United States, Switzerland, and 
Canada (Frenkel 1977; Smiley 1980). 
A second, confederation, was the 
accepted form of federalism prior to 
1787. In a confederation, the con-
stituent units form a union but retain 
most sovereign and constituent 
powers. They establish and maintain 
governmental Relations, 3rd ed. Pacific 
Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole. 
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continuous control over the general 
government which must work 
through them to reach the citizenry. 
The secession of individual units may 
be possible by prior constitutional 
agreement without general consent. 
Classic confederations include the 
Greek Achaean League and the 
United Provinces of the Netherlands. 
The best modern example is the 
European Community (Hughes 1963; 
Elazar 1987; Elazar 1982). 
A third species is federacy, an 
asymmetrical relationship between a 
federated state and a larger federate 
power, providing for potential union 
on the basis of the federated state 
maintaining greater internal auton-
omy by foregoing certain forms of 
participation in the governance of the 
federate power. In the United States 
this kind of arrangement is called 
"commonwealth." Both Puerto Rico 
and the Northern Marianas are fed-
eracies (Friedrich 1968; Elazar 1987). 
A fourth species, associated state-
hood, is similar to federacy in the 
way that confederation is similar to 
federation. Both are equally asym-
metrical but in associated statehood, 
the federate state is less bound to the 
federate power, and the constitution 
which binds them usually has provi-
sions for the severance of ties 
between the two under certain speci-
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